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Cognition: A Functional View
Abstract
Most theories of cognition assume (a) that cognition is mediated by long-term
mental relations, and (b) that the dynamic aspect of cognition is an
information processing system. Consequently, most research either addresses
the problems of the structure and organization of knowledge, or attempts to
trace the fate of the input information in the system. This paper proposes a
shift in the locus of theoretical analysis. Following Bartlett, it argues
that cognitive functioning may be more readily characterized without the
mediation of long-term mental associations and structures, and that the fate
of the input may not be traceable at all. An account of cognition is proposed
in which mental relations are transient functional relations, and in which
psychological permanence is a functional characteristic of the neuronal
system. Psychobiological literature relevant to this proposal is discussed.
The central concept is called the schema-of-the-moment, a functional
organization created by the activity of anatomically distributed
constellations of neuronal elements. Comprehension, remembering, learning,
awareness, and affect are briefly discussed in terms of this active neuronal
mass of the moment. The account emphasizes the direct role of the nervous
system in cognitive functioning.
When psychological theories employ theoretical terms like memory,
representation, and structure, they often do so because the descriptions and
explanations of psychologically interesting phenomena that result are at a
sufficiently abstract level to be informative and intelligible. As a first
step in theory construction the use of theoretical terms at a level close to
the phenomenological level of description is a very helpful, and probably
indispensable strategy. However, there are good reasons to suppose that one
should strive to eventually account for the phenomena of interest in terms of
more concrete constructs.
One reason for attempting to employ concrete constructs in psychological
explanations is that it helps to clarify the distinction between artificial
intelligence (AI) and cognitive psychology as being more than simply
methodological variants on one another. AI is concerned with characterizing
cognition and intelligence in abstracto; its goal is a "machine-independent"
specification of the cognitive software. Theories in cognitive psychology
have to be more constrained. They need to take into account not only the
constraints imposed by people's behavior, but also the sort of constraints
likely to be imposed by the biological hardware, since it is these that give
cognition its uniquely human quality. In fact, Eliashberg (1981), by
examining the properties of hypothetical machines, has shown that ". . the
popular thesis that the problem of the algorithms performed by the brain
. has but little to do with the problem of brain hardware" is inadequate.
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Furthermore, support for this contention can be found in other domains. A
striking example is provided by the recent advances (e.g. Berlin & Kay, 1969;
Kay & McDaniel, 1978) in understanding the relationship between the perception
of color and the meaning of color terms in different languages. It now seems
that "all the basic color categories of the languages of the world are based
on . . . six fundamental neural response categories, whose structures are
determined by the firing patterns of . . .cells in the visual pathway" (Kay,
1981, p. 64). Thus, only after taking account of the physiology of color
perception did it become possible to give a coherent explanation of the
principles governing the way in which people in different cultures speaking
different languages talk about the world of color.
Another more important reason for attempting to explain cognition in
terms of relatively concrete constructs has to do with the ontological status
of the theoretical terms employed. Terms like memory and
knowledge-representation are highly complex abstractions, and it is not at all
clear to what they refer. In AI this is not a problem because the functional
characteristics of the hardware in which these abstract conceptions are
instantiated are sufficiently well understood. However, when we turn our
attention to people the indeterminate reference of theoretical terms can give
rise to ambiguity, vagueness, and misleading implications. This point can be
illustrated by considering the long-term memory metaphor: We talk about mental
representations being stored in memory. These representations are searched
for and retrieved. It is easy to see how, if taken literally, such ideas can
lead to the conclusion that people's heads are populated with a huge number of
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pre-packaged permanent structures corresponding to everything we know. This,
in turn, leads to questions about the organization of memory: what kind of
search mechanisms operate on what kind of global structure to permit efficient
access to encoded representations? Psychologists have from time to time
objected to the heavy theoretical burden imposed upon such terms (e.g.
Bartlett, 1932; Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977; Jenkins, 1977;
Palmer, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1973). Given the merits of the arguments, these
objections have had disproportionately little influence, perhaps because of
the absence of an alternative set of more concrete concepts in terms of which
a coherent view of human cognition might be achieved.
It is our contention that more attention needs to be devoted to the
functional characteristics of the physical systems that exhibit the phenomena
of interest. In fact, we believe that ideally the goal of cognitive
psychology ought to be the specification of those functional properties of the
nervous system that make cognition possible. Such a functional account might
show how mental properties are emergent properties of biological functioning.
It would eschew the wholesale use of complex constructs of unclear referential
status until they have themselves been characterized in terms more closely
tied to the biological hardware.
Whereas it is easy to assume that the patterning aspects of cognition are
based on long-term knowledge structures (schemata, frames, scripts, etc.)
"stored" in memory--an approach that we shall henceforth refer to as the
"structural" approach--the alternative approach need make no such assumption.
It can treat cognition as a functional phenomenon involving, not permanently
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stored knowledge structures but only transient patterns created directly by
the functioning of the biological hardware. This sort of approach can already
be found in James (1890), and in Bartlett (1932) who was concerned with "a
study of the conditions of organic and mental functions, rather than . . an
analysis of mental structures" (p. 304). It is also widespread in modern
psychobiology.
The structural view deals with the dynamic aspects of cognition in terms
of searches for and changes to permanently-stored knowledge structures. But,
since we question the need to postulate such structures, we try to avoid this
way of dealing with the dynamic aspects of cognition: There may not be any
permanent cognitive structures to find or change. If cognition is regarded as
a functional phenomenon, the solution to the static-dynamic problem resolves
itself in the specification of the functioning system. Such a description
will naturally, although indirectly, lead to a characterization of mental
products. A direct description will be unnecessary. Cognitive patterns can
be viewed as transient phenomena and meaning can be "conceptualized as a
momentary . . . pattern" (Bransford, Nitsch, & Franks, 1977, p. 45). In
short, along with Bartlett, Bransford and his colleagues, and Minsky (1980),
we argue that people do not function by selecting templates, rather they
function by creating and recreating transient cognitive patterns.
The view we are proposing is based upon one elementary construct at the
level of biological hardware in terms of which another more abstract, mental,
construct is characterized. The biological construct is that of a physically
unitary and functionally autonomous element, which we will refer to, perhaps
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too loosely, as a neuronal element. The mental construct is that of the
schema-of-the-moment, which is defined in terms of the functional properties
of neuronal elements. We use the term schema-of-the-moment for two main
reasons. First, as we will argue throughout this paper, it is in terms of
this "functioning mass of the moment," as Bartlett (1932) and Head (1920)
called it, that all cognitive activity (including perception, affection,
learning, etc.) takes place. Second, the schema-of-the-moment is assumed to
be the only structural cognitive pattern in existence in a given individual at
a particular time--everything else is neuroanatomic.
Over the years a great deal of empirical data has been gathered
supporting various aspects of the structural approach. The functional view is
less fortunate in this respect. However, it must be emphasized that the major
functional assumption that starkly contrasts the structural and the functional
perspectives is unequivocally supported by neurophysiological evidence and is
shared by all current neuroscientific theories (e.g., Anderson, Silverstein,
Ritz, & Jones, 1977; Arbib, 1980; Edelman, 1978; John, 1967, 1972; Kachalsky,
Rowland, & Blumenthal, 1974; Sperry, 1976; Uttal, 1978). This assumption is
that cognition is a transient phenomenon created by the functioning of
distributed components of the nervous system. The following quotation from
Uttal (1978) illustrates the point:
The major conclusion of this book (as well as what I believe will be the
major guiding theme of psychobiology in the century to come) is that the
essential neural aspects of mental function are to be found in the
organization of the networks into which either individual neurons or
Cognition
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macroscopic brain nuclei are arranged. It is in the momentary states of
activity within these networks that the true equivalents of mental
processes are to be found. (P. 683)
Although one might think that compatibility of psychological theories
with what is known about the human nervous system is an obvious minimal
requirement, such compatibility is frequently conspicuously absent. For
example, Schmitt (1978) complains:
Many theories of higher brain function (learning, memory, perception,
self-awareness, consciousness) have been proposed; but in general they
lack cogency with respect to established anatomical and physiological
facts and are without biophysical and biochemical plausibility. (p. 1)
Again Gallistel (1980) in discussing a psychological model of the control of
limb movement (Adams, 1977) claims that modern neurobiological work on the
mechanisms of coordination render the theory untenable. The message is clear
enough: psychologists need to attend more closely to neurobiological research.
The problem as it relates to psychological research, therefore, does not
seem to be the absence of biologically plausible theories. Such theories
exist in the work of Arbib (e.g., 1980), Freeman (e.g., 1975), John (e.g.,
John, 1972; John & Schwartz, 1978), and Uttal (1978). Rather, in some subtle
way, the problem seems to relate to the deep-seatedness of the influence of
the structural paradigm in cognitive psychology. The structural bias, we
believe, has drawn attention away from existing neuroscientific theories that
are in essence functional. For instance, Jenkins (1981) noted that structural
Cognition
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psychology frequently cites William James' treatment of habit formation and
ignores his "true functionalism."
A special characteristic of our account is that it attempts to bridge the
conceptual gap that results from the absence of a common language between
cognitive psychology and neurophysiology. This gap cannot be filled by merely
translating structural psychological concepts into neurological concepts
(e.g., groups of neurons process the input information and pass it on to the
next group) or vice versa (e.g., neuronal centers represent psychological
units). A truly functional cognitive psychology is needed in "the style of
the brain" (see Arbib, 1980) and it must be consistent with findings in
neurosciences. Such a functional approach must provide the concepts and the
language that would relate two phenomenal domains: The domain of the
functional properties of the neuronal system and the domain of mental and
behavioral structures (Maturana, 1978).
The first section of this paper discusses important aspects of the
schema-of-the-moment and compares it with the notion of schema current in
cognitive psychology. In the latter part of this section, we will present an
overview of the neuroscientific research directly bearing on the problem. The
second section discusses the creation and the development of the schema-of-
the-moment in terms of the functional properties of neuronal elements.
Specific and nonspecific relations and functions underlying the creation and
development of the schema-of-the-moment are also discussed in this section.
Finally, brief accounts of comprehension, remembering and learning, awareness,
and affect are presented in an attempt to illustrate how different
Cognition
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psychological phenomena can be treated in term of a unified account of mental
functioning.
The Schema-of-the-Moment: Some Preliminary Issues
In order to distinguish the notion of a schema as a transient functional
organization from the concept of a schema as a stored mental template, we will
use the term schema-of-the-moment instead of schema. The present section will
describe important aspects of this central concept: What is a schema-of-the-
moment? Just how is it different from more standard notions of a schema? How
is schematic functioning different from information processing?
The Schema-of-the-Moment and the Input-Output Metaphor
A basic tenet of the functional view is that the dynamic aspect of mental
functioning is not an information processing system in any literal sense. The
neuronal system creates and recreates "knowledge," which is a transient
epiphenomenon and lasts only while the underlying neuronal elements are
functioning. There are no pre-functional (pre-activation) psychological
entities or relations. Cognition begins with initiation of functioning, and
mental relations are established only after such initiation (i.e., post-
functionally).
It is our aim to demonstrate in this paper that "recreation" is a better
way to conceptualize brain functioning than "processing" or "reconstruction."
Recreation eliminates the need for the brain to have to deal with the
difficult problems of analysis, synthesis, storage, and organization of
knowledge. It allows the neuronal system to conform structurally to
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neuroanatomic organizational constraints rather than to the organizational
constraints imposed by abstract knowledge structures.
Conceiving of cognition in terms of "creation" eliminates the need for
the input-transformation-output metaphor which dominates current psychological
thinking--the same type of industrial plant metaphor which haunted Galenian
physiology (see Miller, 1978).1 An analogy based on the functioning of the
endocrine glandular system may serve to clarify the contrast between
recreation and input-output transformation. There is a group of cells located
in the cortical part of the adrenal glands. These cells, when activated,
produce a hormone called cortisol. The cells themselves get activated by
another hormone, called ACTH (adrenocorticotropic hormone) released in the
anterior part of the pituitary gland. The crucial point is that there is
absolutely no input-transformation-output relationship between the stimulator
ACTH and the produced cortisol. Adrenal cortical cells, once activated,
create the cortisol through, for example, biochemical operations based on
substances other than those contained in ACTH. It is this dissociation
between the input and the output that renders any system-independent ACTH-to-
cortisol transformation rules, or any precise formal description of the
product based on them, inappropriate. Similarly, neuronal mechanisms active
at a given time combine functionally to create a transient cognitive system.
Such a dynamic functional organization is input-independent in the sense
described above--that there exists an inherent dissociation between the
characteristics of the external stimulation and functional properties of the
neuronal system. Neither is there any structural isomorphism between external
Cognition
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stimulation patterns and created mental structures. There is no invariant
specifiable stimulus or input pattern to correspond to the constantly
developing schema-of-the-moment. There is always a great deal more going on
than can be accounted for just by the contributions of the external
stimulation, or input. Furthermore, contributions of external stimulation are
always subordinate to the functioning of organismic mechanisms.
Function versus Structure
The essential characteristic of the schema-of-the-moment is that it is an
unstable functional pattern. Its structure is analogous to that of a
fountain. As used here, the word functional means "in action" and contrasts
with the term at rest. The term function differs from the word process (see
Iran-Nejad, 1980). The latter requires an object, something to get processed,
while the former does not. Function must also be differentiated from
operation (e.g., addition as in A + B = C) as used by Piaget. The verb
function is an agent-specific term: "Biological function . . implies the
existence of a system" (Piaget, 1971, p. 54). It means that where there is
function, or perhaps dysfunction or malfunction, one would necessarily expect
an agent-system (e.g., a neuron) that would do the functioning. Conversely,
operations are agent-independent and can exist in the world of abstractions.
They are processes per se. They place emphasis on actions rather than on the
system(s) which makes those actions possible.2  Function must also be
differentiated from transformation as used in structural psychology, which is
essentially synonymous with operation even though some transformations might
be readily translated into organismic functions (e.g., activation or
inhibition).
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From the functional perspective, a specific group of neuronal elements in
action creates a unique system, an actual instance of an indefinitely large
number of possible patterns. This is not simply saying that there is a
specific neuroanatomic structure (consisting of elements and neural
connections) which functions to create the functional pattern as has been
suggested, for example, by Feldman (1979). In fact, our view is not a
connectionist one at all. Theoretically, in order for two or more neuronal
elements to join functionally, it is not even necessary that they be related
through specific neuronanatomic connections, although normally they will be.
All that is necessary for a functional pattern to form is that a group of
elements be in action simultaneously. How and when each element began its
activity or whether it did so independently or in relation with other elements
in the pattern is beside the point. Consider another analogy. Imagine a
constellation of lightbulbs each having a unique color: When a subset of them
is on, a unique pattern is generated. It does not matter when each individual
light went on or whether it did so independently of other lightbulbs. The
lightbulbs need not be physically connected. The characteristics of the
pattern are determined by the participating elements and not by the history of
their participation. In sum, while in a structural pattern, it is the long-
term "relations among elements that counts" (Piaget, 1970, p. 9), for a
functional pattern what counts is the elements themselves--their
characteristics, how they function, and how they functionally combine to
produce an internally consistent system.
Cognition
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Post-Functional Mental Relations and Pre-Functional Brain Connections
Once the notion of long-term cognitive associations is disavowed, the
question arises as to the relation between the neuroanatomic organization 
and
the cognitive organization. In particular, it becomes necessary to consider
the extent to which, if any, there is structural conformity between the two
systems. Minsky (1980) draws attention to the problem of specifying this
interrelationship and refers to it as the "crossbar" problem. According to
Minsky, "this problem confronts every brain theory that tries to explain how
the mind is capable of any great range of 'associations'" (p. 124).
In theory, there are at least three solutions. The first possibility is
to postulate a particular (pre-existing or, rather, pre-functional)
neuroanatomic pattern, partial or complete, corresponding to every cognitive
pattern. This essentially amounts to mapping the structural cognitive network
into an isomorphic neuroanatomic network. Strict isomorphism is often
attributed to Gestalt structuralists. Their position is summarized in the
following quotation from Uttal (1978):
The Gestalt mode of description of mental activities has much to offer to
those interested in global pattern effects and the action of aggregates
and may be a more meaningful approach to psychobiological processes than
the atomistic approach proposed by many alternative psychological
theories. However, when the Gestalt psychologists proposed
neurophysiological theories of perception, they turned to simplistic
models that had considerably less to offer than did their descriptive
statements. Their main psychobiological premise was isomorphism, the
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idea that spacial neuroelectric patterns in the brain were geometrically
identical to corresponding mental states. The only concession (and for
isomorphism any concession may in fact be irretrievably damaging) that
the strict isomorphists would make on this issue was that the neural
representation might be topological, i.e., that the geometrical
relationships between the parts might not be congruent to the perception
although the general arrangement must still be maintained. (pp. 24-25)
While isomorphism is no longer tenable in the face of current
psychophysiological evidence, "the propensity to glorify apparently isomorphic
data (even though it may be illusory) is ubiquitous in modern psychobiology"
(Uttal, 1978, p. 360). Isomorphism is also implicit in those structural
psychological theories (e.g., Feldman, 1979) that attempt to translate
directly structural constructs to neural terms and try to identify the "links
between concepts with neural connections."
The second possibility is that the neuronal network is analogous to some
sort of sophisticated telephone network. By allowing directional hard-wired
routes between elements, the nervous system would somehow generate two-unit or
multi-unit (transient) communication patterns. A telephone network is
directional because the initiating unit must know the "address" (see Norman,
1980) of the target unit(s). Directional connectionist models imply "that
'remembering' requires the discharge of those particular cells 
which
constitute the new line, and those of the cells to which the line is directed"
(John, 1972). John (e.g., 1967, 1972, John & Schwartz, 1978) has discussed
the connectionist models and has concluded that they are suspect "on logical,
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psychophysiological and neurophysiological grounds." For instance, John and
his associates (see Thatcher & John 1977) reviewed numerous
electrophysiological studies. All the evidence demonstrates that responses to
the most elementary stimuli (e.g., a flash of light or a click) are made by
cells anatomically distributed throughout the brain and that a given cell
participates in many functional patterns. In order to accommodate this and
similar data proponents of the connectionist view have used "the term
'connection' in a functional sense, cautiously defining it in terms of
relationships while explicitly disclaiming any literal connotaion of a new
anatomical junction." However, "more recently, new responses have commonly
been assumed to depend upon the establishment or facilitation of a new pathway
(or pathways) of synaptic connections between input and output ... " (John,
1972, p. 850).
Thus, according to the connectionist models, if mental relations are
variable and plastic so must synaptic connections be. However, the large
conceptual gap between synaptic plasticity (defined in terms of synaptic
weights, strengths, facilitaion levels, etc.) and mental plasticity renders
synaptic connectionism implausible, at least for the time being:
Although synaptic plasticity has been the object of research attention
for many years, the synaptic effects studies, without exception, are
proposed as analogs of only the simpler forms of learning, such as
classical conditioning, rather than of cognitive learning. This is an
important constraint, for the synaptic hypothesis must transcend an
enormous conceptual gap at this point to be linked to more complex mental
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processes. . . . In the absence of a specifically understood link
between cellular plasticity and learning, the generalization of synaptic
hypothesis must depend upon the logical assertion that any concept no
matter how complicated, can be represented by a sufficiently large number
of elemental and discrete processes. This assertion is a major theorem
of modern mathematics, but in the brain it still represents a statement
of faith that in some fundamental way runs counter to the current
rejection of the idea of concatenated conditioned reflexes in atoms of
learning. That a serious dilemma is thus generated is obvious. That
there are, yet, no resolutions to this dilemma is also undeniable.
(Uttal, 1978), p. 540-541)
The fact that neuronal elements are capable of interacting with other
distant, neuronal elements suggests that there must exist within the nervous
system some sort of a relational medium to make such interaction-at-a-distance
possible, independently of isomorphic synaptic connections. The third
possibility, therefore, and the one we find most plausible, is that in
addition to a directional medium, the neuronal network also constitutes an
all-spreading nondirectional relational medium. Such a medium would allow
(within amplitude, etc., constraints) nondirectional conductance of electrical
or chemical energy in addition to directional element-to-element interactions.
In a totally nondirectional network everything can, potentially, reach
everything else and nothing is aimed at anything directly. Thus, the
initiating unit does not need to know the address of the target unit. Rather,
target units are specialized to get activated in response to (or "to
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recognize") the functioning of the initiating unit and to remain indifferent
to the functioning of any other. Particularly relevant examples of
specialized systems functioning in a nondirectional environment are the
auditory and visual systems of animals. While both of these mechanisms
function in the same environment--filled with sound and light waves--the ears
respond to sound waves but are deaf to light waves while the eyes perceive
light waves but are blind to sound waves. One can imagine that the same
principle holds throughout the neural network. Thus, it is possible that
neuronal elements are uniquely specialized to respond to some particular
functional patterns while remaining indifferent to others.
Clearly, a non-directional model is by necessity localizationist; but it
is also consistent with the global approach developed by John and his
colleagues. It is localizationist because it must assume the existence of
neuronal elements that are physically unitary, functionally autonomous, and
uniquely specialized. It is consistent with John's anti-localization bias and
his global approach because, having rejected, as John does, both "geometric"
and "relational" isomorphism, we can no longer assume that single cells (or
any other unitary local elements) represent "meaningful" (complex, molar,
etc.) mental patterns such as features, concepts, or percepts.
A neuronal element must be physically unitary because it must be an
internally coherent neurological system, rather than only a nerve fragment or
a molecule. It must be functionally autonomous in order to participate in an
indefinite number of functional combinations. And it must be uniquely
specialized in order to be able to preserve its own identity while functioning
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in consonance with other active elements of the moment and in order to so
selectively in the presence of some particular global electrical and/or
chemical pattern and not in the presence of any other. While John and his
colleagues have criticized current localizationist models, they have also
emphasized that any solution to the problem of the interface between the mind
and the brain must come from some compromise between localization and
antilocalization concepts:
Localization of function within any area of the brain must be evaluated
with great caution, even when apparent physiological correlates of
function have been demonstrated in as great detail as has been the case
with the elegant studies of "feature extractor" cells of the visual
cortex. It should go without saying, but we will nontheless state for
the record, that similar caution must be exercised with respect to our
own arguments in this Volume against localization. We voice a strong
warning against overenthusiastic proponents of either position,
localizationist or antilocalization, who ignore or shrug off the
contradictions. It is precisely from the reconciliation of the apparent
contradictions that we stand to learn most about how the brain processes
information. (Thatcher & John, 1977; p. 211)
The evidence gathered by Hubel and Wiesel (1959, 1962, 1965) and others
clearly demonstrates that the brain is not a homogeneous mass, as once was
thought. However, as John and his colleagues have argued, this does not mean
that single cells represent complex mental structures.
Cognition
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We have hypothesized an all-spreading medium in order to clarify, at
least conceptually, the problem of interaction-at-a-distance. An all-
spreading environment, however, does not mean that electrical or chemical
conductance takes place in a vacuum, even though some sort of extracellular
propagation may play an important role (see Nicholson, 1979). Neither should
this mean nonspecificity or imprecision in the pattern of actual neural
connections. The neural network as a whole may serve as a common network.
The two types of physical relational vehicles (directional and non-
directional) may be illustrated by an analogy to the functioning of exocrine
and endocrine glandular systems. Exocrine glands (e.g., the salivary glands)
release their products into specific ducts which direct them to target organs.
These would correspond to directional element-to-element (neuroanatomic)
connections. Endocrine glands, on the other hand, secrete their products into
the extracellular fluid surrounding capillaries; thus, the hormones they
produce enter the blood circulation system, which is itself an all-spreading
environment. This would correspond to any all-spreading relational role
played by the neural network.
As an example of how functional relations can be established via a common
nondirectional medium, as opposed to specific and direct anatomic connections,
consider the functional relation between the pituitary and the adrenal glands
referred to earlier. The ACTH released in the anterior pituitary gland,
located on the lower surface of the brain, serves to stimulate (activate)
cortical adrenal cells located above the kidneys. It is conceivable, in
principle, that a direct point-to-point duct could have been physically
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available to carry ACTH from the pituitary to the adrenal glands. However, if
a tube were to be available from every endocrine gland to its target organ,
organisms would become monstrously complex. Instead, ACTH enters the blood
circulation system. This, of course, takes the hormone to other irrelevant
organs as well (hence, all-spreading and nondirectional), but it is also sure
to reach the adrenal cells which are specialized to get activated by it,
because these cells like everything else are connected to the blood
circulation network.
The possibility that the nervous system is also, in part, an all-
spreading environment analogous to the blood circulation system cannot be
ruled out. As early as the 1920's, Paul Weiss concluded based on existing
evidence that "the central nervous system and the non-nervous periphery
entertain their mutual correspondence by means of some sort of sending-
receiving mechanism, specific for each individual muscle." According to this
view, the central nervous system is "endowed with the capacity for discharging
as many different modes or forms of impulses as there are different muscles in
the limb." There is a specific impulse for every muscle receptor. Every
muscle receptor, on the other hand, "would possess the power to respond
selectively" to its proper impulse. Consequently, if "the central impulses
for a limb muscle were circularized in the whole limb" the mechanism of
selectivity of function "would ensure that every call be answered by the
correct muscle, even though the latter may have been displaced, re-innervated
by strange nerves, and prevented from sending informative messages back to the
centers" (Weiss, 1936, pp. 511-512). Weiss's resonance principle is no longer
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generally accepted by developmental neuroscientists. But we believe his ideas
concerning indiscriminate synaptic connectivity, successfully challenged by
Sperry and his associates (see Attardi & Sperry, 1960, 1963; Meyer & Sperry,
1976), must be distinguished from his suggestive element-implulse specificity
hypothesis, which has yet to be directly tested.
An all-spreading functional environment would imply that a given
functional pattern could stimulate relevant neuronal elements elsewhere in the
nervous system regardless of its place of origin in the neural network and
regardless of any pre-established blueprints. There are definite indications
that this may be the case. Consider a letter recognition (identification)
task. Images ordinarily begin on the retina and presumably stimulate
corresponding centers or elements somewhere in the brain. It is conceivable
that specific "image-to-center" connections as well as long-term graphemic
patterns could mediate recognition. However, recognition need not depend on
specific connections or on pre-existing long-term patterns. Blindfolded
subjects are capable of correctly identifying letters "finger-written" on
their skin. White, Saunders, Scadden, Bach-Y-Rita, and Collins (1970) used a
visual substitution apparatus which converted optical images into tactile
displays which blind or blindfolded subjects were able to "see with their
skin." It was shown that "subjects are able to perceive certain simple
displays . . . almost as soon as they have been introduced" (p. 23) and that
with minimal amounts of training they are able "to identify familiar objects
and to describe their arrangement in depth" (p. 25).
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The hypothesis of functional communication between distinctively
specialized neuronal elements also finds support in the evidence that
establishment of functional relations is possible even after specialized cells
are surgically removed from their original site and regrown at a different
part of the body. If a piece of skin is removed from the belly region 
of a
salamander and planted on its back and if, after regeneration, this skin, 
now
on the back, is stimulated, the animal proceeds to scratch its belly, 
the
original site. Such seemingly maladaptive responses, extensively studied 
by
Sperry and others, are often discussed in the light of the nature/nurture
issue (see, e.g., Rose, 1976). However, more basic than whether something is
innate or acquired is the problem of how it works. One may simply assume 
that
regeneration only connects the pre-specialized skin receptor cells to 
an all-
spreading neural network. There is no need for the establishment 
of
particular nerve fibers to wind their path, through some mysterious innate
guiding mechanism, all the way to the related central cells. Once specialized
receptor cell are merely connected to the neural network (or perhaps to the
particular brain region), they can activate the individual target cells
through generation of unique energy patterns. The energy patterns, generated
by the central cells can, in turn, activate the muscles involved in the
scratching of the belly. Because the belly receptor cells function in the
same unique fashion regardless of where they are located and because this
functioning is recognized by the related central cells as "belly" stimulation,
the animal responds maladaptively. Sperry (e.g., 1943) explained these
results "in terms of reestablishment of specific anatomical associations
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rather than in terms of specific nerve energy and resonance phenomena." But
he also emphasized that "the latter possibility is by no means excluded" (p.
47). In fact, it is still not clear that a resolution between Sperry's
directional connectionism and Weiss' element-impulse specificity model has yet
been achieved (see Meyer & Sperry, 1976; Sperry, 1966; Wall, 1966; Weiss,
1966). As Wall (1966) argued, "the so-called specificity of neuronal function
... may mean that specificity of function can be attained without a
microscopic determination of the exact morphological structure of some parts
of the nervous system" (p. 230).
Given the concept of an all-spreading relational vehicle, the most
efficient way of relating the cognitive system and the neuronal system seems
to be by assuming (a) that the former is comprised of transient functional
relations and (b) that post-functional patterns are independent of any
isomorphic pre-functional neural associations. Independence of post-
functional (mental) relations also resolves Minsky's crossbar problem. As
Minsky (1980) put it "if the mechanisms of thought can be divided into
specialists that intercommunicate only sparsely, then the crossbar problem may
need no general solution. For then, most pairs of agents will have no real
need to talk to one another; indeed, since they speak .. .. different
languages, they could not even understand each other" (p.125). And, to
continue the metaphor, if they can understand each other, they will do so
regardless of where they are located or whether they are connected directly so
long as they can "hear" each other (i.e., so long as they are part of the
overall neural network).
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Creation and Development of the Schema-of-the-Moment
This section attempts to draw a coherent picture of how the schema-of-
the-moment is created based on the activity of functionally autonomous
neuronal elements. A few assumptions are made concerning the functional
properties of physically unitary neuronal elements and about the way they
interact, and it is shown how such assumptions may make it possible to give a
coherent account of the creation and the space-time development of the
schema-of-the-moment. These assumptions, while speculative in detail, are
generally supported by existing neurophysiological evidence bearing on
localized and distributed functional properties of the nervous system.
Because of the emphasis on the coherence of the functional model, we will not
interrupt the discussion to substantiate every claim. The interested reader
is encouraged to consult the highly readable discussions of the relevant
research by Hubel and Wiesel (1980), Thatcher and John (1977), and by Uttal
(1978). Hubel and Wiesel argued that "whatever any given region of the brain
does, it does locally," in terms of neurons specialized to respond to highly
specific stimulus characteristics. Thatcher and John, on the other hand,
discussed the developmental properties of the "dynamic global representational
system." Among the properties considered were expansion (i.e., inclusion of
more brain structure), tuning (i.e., enhanced activity in those parts of the
brain that are most concerned with the performance of the response),
reorganization (i.e., turning on of certain neuronal populations and turning
off of others), and coherence (i.e., synchronous activity of distributed
neuronal populations). Finally, Uttal discussed the microscopic and
macroscopic physiological equivalents of psychological structures.
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Are Pre-Existing Long-Term Patterns Necessary?
As we have said, current approaches to cognition and comprehension
presuppose the existence of long-term underlying blueprints for cognitive
functioning to take place.3 For instance, it is often claimed that in
comprehension various aspects of the input are assimilated to preformed
schemata. Accordingly, in a particular situation, a suitable set of schemata
is found to account for the input data (e.g., Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). It
is these instantiated schemata which constitute the interpretation of the
input.
One motivation for hypothesizing long-term mental structures is the fact
that ideas seem to come to mind (to be recalled, etc.) together, or in
relation to one another. It is then assumed that they stay together, in some
cognitive warehouse, even when they are not operative. Thus, the structural
approach maintains that ideas are related before they become operative.
However, from the functional perspective, relations among ideas are
established only after they become operative; cognitive patterns are thus
transient and unstable.
The only requirement for two (or more) elements to combine functionally
is that both be in a state of simultaneous functioning. The light-
constellation analogy once again provides an illustration. Two or more
lightbulbs in the constellation may have absolutely no connection with one
another; but once they are on, they can give rise to a unique pattern of
light. They need not go on in relation to one another or even at the same
time. It is the elements and not the structural connections among them that
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count. In fact, a given (functional) pattern could result from a long series
of steps in which some lights would go on, some would go off, and some would
gain in brightness while others become dimmer.
The assumption of post-functional relations raises a new set of problems
about the nature of psychological patterns and their formation. We now have
to ask such questions as: What are the functional properties of neuronal
elements? What types of functional relations exist between elements? How do
neuronal elements initiate functioning? What is the role of already active
elements in the initiation of functioning of other elements? What is the role
of external stimulus patterns? And so on.
Some Definitions
In order to demonstrate how cognitive functioning is possible in terms of
simultaneous activity of functionally independent neuronal elements, we must
take a closer look at some key concepts. For the sake of clarity, we will
continue to use the light-constellation analogy. Let us suppose that our
array of lightbulbs contains two broad categories of lightbulbs, namely,
colored and uncolored ones. We will call the colored bulbs "specialized
elements." The uncolored bulbs we will call "raw elements," implying that
they can become specialized by getting painted a particular color. In this
array, each bulb can "perform" a few feats always in the same unique fashion:
it can go on or off, it can become brighter or dimmer, and if it is not
already, it can become specialized. Furthermore, combinations of specialized
elements generate unique patterns of light. Similarly (and now we are out of
the analogy), the neuronal network can be assumed to consist of a great number
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of elements, each of which can become specialized and each of which can get
activated or inhibited. Each specialized element (a) produces a unique
pattern of energy, (b) initiates functioning consistently in the presence of
some unique pattern of internal or external energy, and (c) can generate, when
functioning, a unique feeling of awareness. So, a specialized element is a
discrete, functionally independent unit with quite specific but very limited
properties. This assumption is consistent with the view that "neurons, in the
course of differentiation and development and in processing of information
over the span of the organism's lifetime, develop unique identities:
genetically and experientially determined individualities" (Schmitt, 1970,
p. 208).
Two or more simultaneously functioning neuronal elements may combine
post-functionally to constitute a functional organization. We will refer to
such a group of elements as a constellation. Constellations differ from
elements in several respects. Unlike elements, they cannot be considered
specialized. This is because they contain autonomous elements which can
participate in other constellations. Elements are assumed to be localized and
physically unitary while, given the all-spreading environment, constellations
can have elements scattered throughout the nervous system. While individual
elements possess specific functional properties that theoretically are
unambiguously traceable to some unitary physical entity--the element
itself--constellations have nonspecific properties--properties which cannot be
traced to any unitary physical entity because they are different from those
possessed by any one of the participating elements.
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As we are using it, the word combine in the present context refers to the
establishment of transient functional relations among anatomically distributed
neuronal elements. It also refers to the merging of specific energy or
awareness patterns resulting in novel nonspecific energy and awareness
patterns. In the case of energy, pattern combinations can be conceptualized
in terms of interference patterns. The existence of interference patterns in
the functioning brain has been hypothesized by John Eccles and by Karl Pribram
(see, e.g., Goleman, 1979). Similarly, the emergent and combinatorial nature
of awareness has been hypothesized by Sperry (1969, 1976). Awareness is
interpreted by Sperry "to be a dynamic emergent property of cerebral
excitation. As such, conscious experience becomes inseparably tied to the
material brain process" (1969, p. 533). And, finally, with respect to the
functioning of individual neuronal elements, combination may be conceived as
"acting in concert." Evidence gathered by John and Killam (1960) supports
this notion. These authors found that as learning progressed, evoked
potentials from wide areas of the brain became more similar.
It is now possible to see how cognitive functioning might be determined
and constrained solely by the functional properties of independent neuronal
elements without the need for postulating long-term structural relations.
When a person hears, for instance, the word "cow," the unique pattern of
external energy which reaches the ear activates not an isomorphic pre-existing
structure but many functionally independent neuronal elements in the auditory
cortex. These elements combine post-functionally into a unitary interacting
constellation of neuronal elements and, consequently, a functional
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organization. The latter, having constituted a momentary independent pattern,
will, in turn, activate (or inhibit) other (perceptual, affective, etc.)
autonomous elements in various other sections of the brain. The totality of
the just-activated constellation is a transient organization that constitutes
the idea of a cow and, of course, a great deal more (or less) depending on the
schema-of-the-moment (i.e., depending on the functional state of the system
when the word "cow" was heard).
Thus comprehension need neither draw upon nor result in the construction
of permanent mental representations. But, now, if no long-term representation
is preserved, how are such things as recognition possible? One answer is that
recognition need not be explained in terms of the relations between elements,
as preservation of mental representations would imply. Recognition can be
explained in terms of elements only: It can occur to the extent that the
schema-of-the-moment contains the same functional elements that were involved
in some previous schema-of-the-moment. This gives neuronal elements
functional independence--freedom to participate in other functional patterns.
It further eliminates the need to claim (a) that the elements initiate
functioning together, in relation to one another, or in the same original
order, (b) that the mental pattern is preserved in the interim, and (c) that
the underlying neuroanatomic structure somehow uniquely corresponds to the
generated cognitive pattern.
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Types of Functional Relations
Directional and all-spreading relational vehicles and specialized
neuronal elements provide the basis for specifying the different types of
functional relations that can exist among neuronal elements. An important
consequence of allowing an all-spreading relational medium is that it makes it
possible to see how cognitive functioning, while being a direct result of
neuronal activity, can also be considered somewhat independently of the actual
neural fibers. Thus, it eliminates the need to trace, in theory or in
practice, neuroanatomic connections. It draws the line between psychology as
a science concerned with mental functioning and neuroanatomy as a science
dealing with neural architecture. A basic problem in the psychological domain
is, therefore, specification of possible functional relations (as opposed to
neuroanatomic connections) among neuronal elements.
Relevant to this problem is the system of relations postulated by
Festinger (1957). Three types of relations are assumed to exist among
cognitions (cognitive units): consonance, dissonance, and irrelevance.
According to Festinger, cognitions X and Y are consonant if one follows from
the other. When two cognitions have nothing to do with each other, the
relation is irrelevance. And, finally, "two elements are in a dissonant
relation, if considering these two alone, the obverse of one element would
follow from the other" (p. 13).
Festinger's system of basic relations may be readily translated into
functional terms. In fact, the notion of dissonance as an inconsistent
relation between two cognitions is only meaningful if it is conceived as a
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functional relation. This is because no contradiction should arise when not-Y
does actually follow from X. As the expression follow from suggests, the
latter is a consonant relation. Contradiction should arise if the relation
between not-Y and X is consonant and if, in some particular situation, X and Y
compete for activation.
A functional definition of dissonance would also eliminate a potential
misinterpretation of Festinger's definition. Aronson (1968), for instance,
states that "dissonance is a negative drive state which occurs whenever an
individual simultaneously holds two cognitions . . . which are psychologically
inconsistent" (pp. 5-6). But simultaneously "holding" inconsistent beliefs
need not necessarily give rise to dissonance (i.e., to experiencing
contradiction or a negative drive state). An individual may truly believe
that smoking is hazardous, but this does not necessarily mean that every time
a cigarette is lit dissonance and/or unpleasantness is experienced. Based on
the functional assumption, two or more elements give rise to dissonance only
if they are competing for simultaneous functioning. In other words,
dissonance is a post-functional phenomenon.
How can Festinger's system of relations be translated into long-term
characteristics of neuronal elements? The basic property of neuronal elements
is specialization. This concept directly implies consonance and irrelevance,
and indirectly implies dissonance.
Consider three elements, A, B, and C. Suppose that element A is
specialized to generate a unique energy pattern, E(A). Element B is
specialized to get activated in the presence of E(A). This means that there
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is an A-to-B consonant functional relationship. E(A) is a sufficient
condition for activation of B. On the other hand, specialization of elements
other than B could be such that the presence of E(A) would have no effect on
them. This would mean an A-to-NON-B irrelevant functional relationship.
Similarly, a C-to-B activation-inhibition consonant relationship would imply a
C-to-NON-B irrelevant functional relation: E(C) would constitute a sufficient
condition for inhibition of B and no other element.
Now suppose that A and C are active at the same time. E(A) will tend to
activate B while E(C) will tend to inhibit it. Such dissonance will bring
about an unstable state of dissolution: it will tend to break the A-to-B
activation-activation relationship and/or the C-to-B activation-inhibition
relationship. Resolution can be achieved if E(A), E(C), or both are
eliminated.
In theory, there can be at least three types of consonance. In the first
type, activation of A always leads to activation of B. We will refer to this
as logical consonance. In the second type, A does not necessarily activate B.
For instance, E(A) would activate B only if B was not already in a state of
inhibition. If B were in a state of inhibition, then E(A) would activate C,
as an alternative to B. We will refer to this type of consonance as pragmatic
consonance (cf. Brewer, 1977).
In logical and in pragmatic consonance, one element generates the
conditions for the initiation and/or maintenance of functioning in another
element. In the third type of consonance, while initiation cannot take place
merely as a consequence of the functioning of the first element, the elements
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can combine once each of them is independently activated. This type of
consonance may be referred to as pure consonance.
With respect to initiation of functioning, therefore, logical consonance
can be referred to as single-source dependent consonance, while both pragmatic
and pure consonance are multiple-source dependent. This means that in the
latter cases, activation of the second element must depend on sources of
initiation other than the first element. If this analysis is correct, it
means that if A is related to several alternatives it does not make very much
sense to characterize the situation by assigning probabilities to the
alternatives. Doing so would, in effect, mean trying to explain the
relational set in terms of the characteristics of A alone or in terms of some
long-term relations (e.g., strength of association). In functional terms, A
does all it can do by behaving always in the same fashion. While in logical
consonance, this is a sufficient condition for the activation of B, in
pragmatic and pure consonance, it is not. Contributions of other sources than
the first element are also necessary for initiation of functioning in the
second element. Assignment of probabilities makes the least sense with
respect to pure consonance, because while this type of consonance seems to
play a central role especially in novel situations, the probability of the
first element activating the second is theoretically zero.
The concept of multiple-source dependence is consistent with the way
organismic nervous systems are designed to interact with the environment. It
seems as though, in order for the nervous system to function the way it does,
nature has found it profitable to relate organisms to the world through more
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than one sense organ, each serving as an independent source of functional
initiation.
Multiple-source dependence inevitably results, at some time or other, in
dissonance. In general terms, dissonance can be defined as an unstable state
of functioning in which elements will tend to behave in the opposite direction
from their consonant functioning under the influence of independent initiation
sources. For instance, under conflicting stimulation from different sources,
an A-to-B activation-activation consonant relation becomes dissonant if B
tends to undergo inhibition. However, conflicting situations would simply not
arise in a single-source functional system.
5
While it is presumably at the level of neuronal elements that functional
relations operate, one may speak of the same relations holding among
constellations. Two or more constellations may be said to relate by pure,
logical, or pragmatic consonance to form more complex patterns. It must be
emphasized, however, that constellations do not relate through direct
constellation-to-constellation relations. Rather combining takes place at the
level of individual elements. To illustrate how this might work, let us go
back to the concept of interference patterns. Imagine throwing a handful of
pebbles into a pond. Each individual pebble plays its role as a specific
independent element in the creation of the nonspecific overall pattern. Now
imagine throwing two or more handfuls at adjacent spots. While, once again,
the separate wave patterns merge to constitute a more global combination, it
is still at the level of individual pebbles that the nature of the interaction
is determined. Similarly, the totality of all the functioning neuronal
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constellations forms a nonspecific unitary pattern; but it is the functioning
of the autonomous individual elements which determines the interaction.
The concepts of consonance, dissonance, and irrelevance clarify how
functioning neuronal elements might interact. It also becomes more evident
that the development of the schema-of-the-moment is not a straightforward
combination of functioning elements. Rather, since the "complexity of
'schematic' formation means that many objects, many stimuli, many reactions,
get organized simultaneously into different 'schemes,' . . . they tend to set
into activity various cross-streams of organized influences" (Bartlett, 1932,
p. 302), many of which may be in antagonistic (dissonant) relations.
Endogenous and Exogenous Sources of Functional Initiation
The terms endogenous and exogenous have two connotations. A static
connotation, meaning internal and external, and a dynamic connotation, meaning
"outward" and "inward" from an internal or an external origin (source or
cause), respectively. We intend to imply both of these connotations.
The schema-of-the-moment is the combined totality of the already-active
relevant neuronal elements. This constellation of elements may be referred to
as the endogenous constellation. It is endogenous to the unitary organization
(and experience) of the moment. However, what is already occurring in the
schema-of-the-moment will, of course, be affected by what happens to elements
which are not yet active. For instance, when a neuronal element gets
activated, it may relate, not directly and immediately to endogenous elements,
but to other elements outside the schema-of-the-moment, i.e., other non-active
elements or other active elements which are (by themselves) irrelevant to the
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endogenous organization. Consequently, a local exogenous constellation is
formed, exogenous, that is, with respect to the schema-of-the-moment. Such an
exogenous constellation may or may not combine with the schema-of-the-moment
and must be distinguished from it. An important exogenous constellation is
the just-activated constellation--one whose elements have just started
functioning.
What causes initiation of functioning in inactive elements? The
assumption that pre-functional blueprints do not exist, and the complementary
claim that mental relations are established only post-functionally, raises a
basic problem: How do neuronal elements come to be in a state of functioning
to begin with? The answer to this question must be sought, not in some pre-
functional arrangement of elements in a mental store, but in the fact that the
neuronal system is a multiple-source dependent system with respect to
functional initiation. First, there are endogenous sources. A large number
of neuronal elements in the schema-of-the-moment are always in a functional
state (at least during waking hours); they are specialized to maintain a
particular functional rhythm or cycle. The element constellations creating
the concept of self, of time, and of space are examples. Secondly, there is
what might be called the combinatorial source. As elements combine, they set
the stage for the initiation of functioning in other elements through emergent
logical and pragmatic functional relations. And finally, there are the most
important exogenous sources--those external energy patterns which constantly
influence the neuronal system through several independent sense organs.
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Some Traditional Problems Reconsidered
This section discusses, in an intentionally perfunctory fashion, how the
functional view causes a reconceptualization of such traditional problems as
comprehension, remembering and learning, awareness, and affect. Its aim is
only to offer an impressionistic account by way of illustrating how these
issues can be approached in terms of a unified, global account of cognition.
Comprehension
Given the endogenous, emergent (combinatorial), and exogenous sources of
initiation and combination, what happens during comprehension is readily
specifiable. Comprehension will prosper to the extent that these sources play
their indispensable role and will suffer to the degree that they do not. In
oral language comprehension, for instance, there are at least two independent
external sources of initiation (auditory and visual), in reading comprehension
there is one (visual).
In the absence of a relevant schema-of-the-moment, comprehension remains
highly impoverished or does not take place at all. In other words,
comprehension will suffer to the extent that the schema-of-the-moment and the
just-activated constellation do not contain mutually-relevant elements. This
seems to be the case, for example, when a reader goes through the motions of
reading but is preoccupied with something else; there is no interaction
between endogenous and exogenous functioning. Presumably, while textual
stimuli do activate sensory neuronal elements, the resulting irrelevant just-
activated constellations sooner or later drop out of activation since they
fail to establish post-functional relations with the schema-of-the-moment.
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This claim is similar to, but not the same as, the one implied by
traditional theories of comprehension. It is similar insofar as it finds
support in the research motivated by the influence of top-down high-level
patterns on comprehension. It is different because it does not appeal to
pre-functional relations; nor does it imply that comprehension takes place in
some mental "location" such as a short-term memory buffer (e.g., Kintsch & van
Dijk, 1978) or a message center (Rumelhart, 1977); nor does it have to face
the schema-selection and other related problems. Comprehension fails to the
extent that active neuronal elements consonant with the just-activated pattern
are not present in the schema-of-the-moment. This can happen either because
such elements are not present in the nervous system at all, or because the
current endogenous, exogenous, and emergent sources of initiation cannot
activate them.
That local functional patterns do, in fact, remain merely momentary to
the extent that the schema-of-the-moment and the just-activated constellation
do not contain mutually-relevant elements is supported by the results of an
often-cited experiment by Bransford and Johnson (1972). Subjects read well-
formed passages about, say, doing the laundry. However, the passages were
constructed in such a way that it was impossible to figure out what they were
about without being told. Those who only saw the passages found them
difficult to understand and showed poor recall. Recall was also almost as
poor for those who were told that the passage was about "washing clothes"
after they had finished reading it. However, subjects who were given this
topic before reading showed greatly facilitated comprehension and recall.
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This experiment illustrates the essential role simultaneous functioning plays
in the establishment of psychological relations. Only when the schema-of-
the-moment contains relevant elements, can post-functional relations with
elements activated by textual stimuli be established. Only then can emergent
sources of initiation work properly; and only then can coherent mental
patterns result, novel ideas emerge, and better comprehension take place.
Different schemata-of-the-moment can lead to different interpretations of
the same text (e.g., Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 1977; Pichert &
Anderson, 1977; Schallert, 1976). This is because at any given instant during
comprehension, the schema-of-the-moment combines with that portion of the
just-activated pattern which is relevant and "ignores" the irrelevant. In
Pichert and Anderson, for instance, different groups of subjects were
instructed to read the same passages while keeping in mind different
perspectives. One of the passages was about two boys playing hooky from
school who took a tour through the house of one of the boys. The passage was
read from the perspective of a burglar, a homebuyer, or no directed
perspective. Unlike previous studies, which had reported high correlations
among importance ratings by different groups of subjects reading the same
passage, the present study showed a mean intercorrelation of .11 among the
three groups. Importance ratings for a given perspective also correlated
higher with the recall from that perspective than with that of readers who had
taken other perspectives.
Knowing the motive (having a relevant constellation activated) of the
character of a story has also been shown to affect its comprehension. In a
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study by Owens, Bower, and Black reported in Bower (1978), subjects read five
neutral sequences representing five scripts: making a cup of coffee, visiting
a doctor, attending a lecture, going grocery shopping, and attending a party.
One group of subjects read only the event sequences. A second group read the
event sequences preceded by a description of the motive of the person who
carried out the events. Subjects who saw the motive description recalled more
scripts, remembered more of the propositions stated in the text, and made more
inferences than those who read the event sequences only.
Such experiments are usually conducted to demonstrate the effects of
prior knowledge on remembering and comprehension. What they actually show is
that context, perspective, affective states, motives, or in short, the entire
functional state of the moment must be taken into account. Some theorists
(e.g., Bower, 1981) attempt to explain such findings in terms of associative
connections among (tokens of) concepts stored in an associative network.
Others, however, reject the theoretical underpinnings of such accounts as
inadequate because they view them as being based on an incorrect
characterization of human memory. For example, Norman (1980) claims that
"associations among memory concepts . . simply will not do." Bartlett (1932)
believes that such approaches are "responsible for very much unnecessary
difficulty in psychological discussion," and yet others have pointed out that
such descriptions of stored products are fruitless (Bransford, McCarrell,
Franks, & Nitsch, 1977; Bransford, Nitsch, & Franks, 1977). Associative
theories also imply "geometric" or "relational" isomorphism, and, to the
extent that they do so, they contradict the neurophysiological evidence
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discussed earlier. We prefer to view such results as support for the notion
that comprehension, like remembering, is a constantly developing global
activity. As Bartlett (1932) pointed out, "the active settings [the
schemata-of-the-moment] . . . are living and developing, are a complex
expression of the life of the moment . . ." (p. 214). Such an active mass of
the moment does not involve one, or two, or even several local schemata (see
Mandler, 1981). There is no "countable" mental entity. There are no complex
building blocks (see Rumelhart, 1980). There is total continuity, not only
with the immediate comprehension context, but also in time, in space, and with
personal history. Bransford et al. (1977) argued that past experiences set
the stage for comprehension and perception. The stage-setting metaphor was to
capture this continuity. They write:
Consider some possible understood meanings or significances of a
statement like "I'm going to drive to Minneapolis tonight." If the
speaker is in St. Paul, Minnesota, the statement is not surprising. If
the speaker is in California, one realizes that the person is in for a
long drive. And if the speaker is in Europe, the statement seems
strange. Or consider reading a newspaper heading like "Peace finally
comes to Europe." What is the significance of this statement? If one is
reading an old newspaper, it is a historical fact. If one is reading
today's paper, it is understood differently. And what is the
significance of a phrase like "today's paper?" The understood
significance of this utterance changes everyday. (pp. 436-437)
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In spite of this total continuity, it is often readily possible to single out
particular components of the schema-of-the-moment. However, even at the time
of focussing on a single "distant" component, the continuity is never lost. A
quick excursion to a remote childhood experience does not destroy the
experience of the moment. It seems that it is always the past that "visits"
the present (by getting recreated when the conditions are suitable) and not
the present that searches for the past. Transitions are almost always smooth
and continuous.
The structure of the just-activated constellation and the way it
interacts with the schema-of-the-moment is also governed by analogous
plasticity. The schema-of-the-moment does not assimilate meanings or concepts
in their intact holistic form. Rather, by the very nature of its unique
global functional properties, as well as that of the properties of its
functioning constituents, it establishes post-functional relations with that
portion of the just-activated constellation which "is most relevant to the
needs of the moment." It is possible for one individual element of the just-
activated constellation to get singled out, if that is the only element
relevant to the schema-of-the-moment. This plasticity is absolutely essential
if one is to comprehend novel or metaphoric statements. In comprehension of a
simile like "A whale is like a skyscraper," there is seldom any difficulty in
singling out the elements underlying "size." We believe all this is possible
because active neuronal elements relate through transient, hence readily
changeable, functional relations.
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The assumption that the constituents of the schema-of-the-moment combine
functionally, among themselves or with those contained in the just-activated
constellation, to create a unique global functional system with unique
properties suggests that functional conditions and relations in the schema-
of-the-moment (e.g., the characteristic energy or interference patterns)
constantly change and, consequently, that schema constituents must change
significance accordingly. Emergent functional conditions set the stage for
further new combinations, thus giving rise to new experiences (ideas,
meanings, etc.). Most changes in the schema-of-the-moment do not result in
disruption of its global properties. Rather, they are local changes involving
the addition and deletion of active neuronal elements. The schema-of-the-
moment "survives" these local changes thus maintaining its global properties.
Consider for example, a person waiting in an airport for the arrival of a
friend. As he waits, endogenous, exogenous, and emergent sources of
(initiation of) functioning maintain continuity in space (he implicitly knows
he is in the airport, in the town of . . ., the country of . . ., and so on)
and in time (he knows it is about such and such hour in the afternoon of an
extremely cold winter day). He looks up and sees in the cold but clear sky a
distant spot. This rather impoverished external stimulation activates visual
elements consonant with those already active, thus creating the idea that a
plane is approaching. As the plane draws closer, there is more activity of
specialized neurons in the auditory, visual, and other areas of the nervous
system (he now hears and sees the plane clearly; he sees it touch the ground;
he is almost certain that his friend is going to come out appropriately
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dressed for the weather, and so on). The passengers begin leaving the plane.
He sees his friend and she sees him; and so forth. While all these are
substantial changes and shifts in functioning, the overall schema-of-the-
moment always maintains its continuity and its global properties. The gradual
phenomenological changes are a result of merely local changes in the schema-
of-the-moment. Some elements are added and some are deleted. However, the
global properties of the schema-of-the-moment remain essentially unaffected by
these local changes, resulting in a continuous and unitary phenomenological
experience.
Changes in global characteristics also occur, as a function of the just-
activated constellation. When such (dramatic) changes occur, surviving local
constituents establish new functional relations and, consequently, assume a
new significance relative to the new functional pattern with its unique global
aspects. The following quotation from McHugh (1968) illustrates the point:
We have all heard stories of someone who has just missed being killed in
an airplane crash. Suppose the emergent item is the "airplane ride," in
that it belongs to both a later and an earlier system [schema-of-the-
moment]. As the person is told that the airplane is full because it is
oversold, the "airplane ride" assumes the character of a missed
appointment in some other city (exemplifying the influence of the future
on the present thwarted airplane ride). In the later system, after being
told of the crash, the significance of the ride changes, because the
person is now "lucky" to have escaped disaster. The meaning of the
airplane ride has changed, and it is emergent because future programs
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influence the depiction of the present, just as the actual events that
occur in the future (now the present) make it necessary to reconstruct
the past, in this case from disappointment to relief for the passenger.
(pp. 25-26)
This passage illustrates how the significance of local schema constituents
(e.g., the airplane ride) changes as a result of changes in global properties
and vice versa. The result: constant emergence (creation) of (new or old)
ideas and meanings.6
Examples of dramatic global changes (reorganizations) are also abundant
in literature. In a short story by Thurmond (1980), for instance, a nurse,
Marilyn, leaves the hospital where she works after a late night shift. She
goes to a gas station for gas, and accepting the invitation of the attendant,
Gabriel, she goes inside his office. As they go inside he quickly locks the
door and takes a gun out of a drawer. The story leads strongly to the
expectation of rape or mugging. However, the story ends very differently.
After recovery from her initial shock, she hears him say that he invited her
inside in order to protect her because, while filling the tank, he had seen
someone hiding on the floor in the back of her car. Comprehension of such
stories involves a more or less instantaneous global reorganization. One
would expect such reorganizations to be prohibited to the extent that long-
term pre-functional associations connected schema constituents, and
facilitated to the extent that relations between elements were temporary and
post-functional. For a psychobiological discussion of how such shifts of
activation might occur, see Arbib (1980).
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Remembering and Learning
According to the functional view, remembering is a by-product of
cognitive functioning. It is built into the properties of specialized
neuronal elements and can be described only indirectly in terms of the
initiation of activation in neuronal elements, for instance. The principles
underlying remembering are essentially those which underlie other higher brain
functions such as thinking. There is no need to postulate memory-specific
mechanisms (e.g., retrieval systems) or structures (see Jenkins, 1977). In
other words, the functional view makes it possible to see through the
construct of "memory" and, once this is done, the components seem less
memory-like, in the traditional sense of the term.
The type of problems facing different kinds of memory theories are
multifarious. The "storage" metaphor gives rise to severe problems of
organization and "address" (Norman, 1980), while the neural-wire theory runs
into what Minsky calls the "crossbar" problem. Norman (1980) has brought such
problems together in the following paragraph:
Associations among memory concepts . . simply will not do. That
implies much too much knowledge of the wire (or its biological
equivalent) that is to snake its way among the already existing stuff
S. Alternatives to wires are not easy to find, the major candidate
being numbered, labeled places . . . Then, the association between two
memory structures is done by giving each one the unique name of the
other, trusting to the existence of some clever machinery that can get
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from one place to another if only it has this name. This problem--I call
it the "address problem"--is fundamental to the organization of any large
scale associative memory. (p. 22)
In rejecting the notion of a long-term associative memory, the functional
view seems to create a new problem. If mental structures and relations are
transient, how can people remember anything? That this question appears to be
so challenging seems to us to be a reflection of the deep-seatedness of the
permanent-storage metaphor. However, we are not alone in calling such models
into question. From time to time, others have also questioned the validity of
traditional memory metaphors. For example, Bransford et al. (1977) write:
It seems reasonable to suggest that current uses of the term memory
frequently involve tacit or explicit assumptions not too different from
those noted by Ebbinghaus [as unsuitable]: for example, that memory can
be broken down into a set of memories, that these consist of relatively
independent traces that are stored in some location, that these traces
must be searched for and retrieved in order to produce remembering, and
that appropriate traces must be "contrasted" in order for past
experiences to have their effects on subsequent events. If memory is
defined in this way, it becomes necessary to consider the possibility
that the concept of memory (and memories) is simply one of many general
hypotheses about the processes underlying remembering." (pp. 431-432)
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Like Bartlett (1932), Bransford et al. (1977) and Jenkins (1977) also
provide genuine alternatives. In fact, we believe they have essentially
specified the major ingredients of a functional theory of remembering. They
have argued that "memory performance is . . . not simply a function of local
properties of individual traces, but is rather a function of the global
characteristics of the set of acquisition experiences as a whole" (Bransford
et al., 1977, p. 463). Similarly, Bartlett (1932) argued that remembering is
"built out of our attitude towards a whole active mass of organized past
reactions and experiences" (p. 213).
Since we have defined the global properties of the schema-of-the-moment,
we can characterize remembering as the recreation of a schema-of-the-moment
with global properties the same as those of a previous schema-of-the-moment,
but, of course, with inevitable local differences. The coherent global
totality maintains the continuity of the original experience, including its
continuity in time, in space, and in personal experiences. Consider, for
example, the following simple experiment from Bransford et al. (1977):
The experimenter approached a group of people in a seminar and stated:
"This is a recognition experiment. I want you to tell me whether you
have heard these words before . . . That is, heard them between 1:00 and
1:15 yesterday." And the experimenter immediately began reading the
words. (p. 441)
The authors report that students violently objected to this procedure, a
frequent complaint being "Wait a minute, I don't know where I was." What does
Cognition
49
the recognition of the words used have to do with the place they were used?
If the subjects did manage to remember where they were at the time, would that
improve their performance in recalling the words they used? It seems that for
these subjects the experiential continuity between the place and the words
used was a requirement for proper recognition of the latter.
How is the global totality of past experiences recreated? According to
the functional theory, recreation of a past schema-of-the-moment occurs to the
extent that prevailing sources of initiation of functioning manage to activate
the same constellations of uniquely specialized neuronal elements as were
active at the time of the initial creation. These were endogenous functioning
(e.g., focussing: see the section on awareness below), exogenous sources
(e.g., probing, reminding), and emergent sources (i.e., consonant and
dissonant functional relations).
Once the global schema-of-the-moment is recreated, recall production
would require individualization (Bartlett, 1932), or unique differentiation
(Bransford et al., 1977) of the components of the schema-of-the-moment.
According to Bartlett (1932), this is mediated by awareness. The system
somehow manages to "turn round upon itself." The global aspect manages to
affect the functioning of local components. We believe this is possible
because awareness enables the system to get local component constellations of
neuronal elements to function independently of the overall schema-of-the-
moment. That awareness can influence the activity of neuronal elements, has
been postulated by Sperry (e.g., 1976).
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We must also say something about what happens between the first creation
of a schema-of-the-moment and its subsequent recreation. This is especially
important because of the nature of functional relations we postulated among
neuronal elements. In other words, in the case of pragmatic consonance, where
the activation of one neuronal element can lead to the activation of one of
the several equally consonant alternatives, the global schema-of-the-moment
cannot provide the basis for determining which of the alternative components
was actually active at the time of initial creation. Given this
consideration, we are forced to speculate about what happens to neuronal
elements from one activation to another; especially, since we assume that a
neuronal element can participate in many combinations. It seems that the most
parsimonious proposal is to assume (a) that an element can assume one of two
possible functional orientations--an excitatory orientation or an inhibitary
orientation--and (b) that a given element can somehow preserve the orientation
of its most recent activation. This would mean that if there was an A-to-B
activation-activation relation at the time of initial creation, the actual A-
to-B relation at the time of recall would be the one immediately prior to
recall activation. This would imply that in the case of two pragmatically
consonant elements or element constellations, a person would normally have no
way of determining which of the equally consonant alternatives was actually
active in the initial schema-of-the-moment.
Why would an element change orientation? The dissonance between
exogenous and endogenous functioning is one reason. Under the influence of a
dissonant just-activated pattern, a neuronal element may be forced to change
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its orientation. Shifts in orientation may simply change the functional
relations within the same schema-of-the-moment. An equally consonant element
may replace previously active elements which now undergo inhibition.
Orientation changes may also result in dramatic shifts. Ordinarily, such
shifts are only partial; there are always enough survivor elements to safe-
guard a "smooth" transition to the post-shift schema-of-the-moment. Among the
survivors may be elements that are endogenously very resistant to change, like
those involved in the concepts of self, of space, or of time. However, at
times (e.g., during life-threatening circumstances) even these elements could
change their orientations. When total shifts occur, a whole set of neuronal
elements, which often maintain an excitatory orientation (if not a permanent
functional state) to keep the individual's personal history alive, suddenly
may reverse this orientation into an inhibitary state. The result would be
retroactive amnesia.
It must be reiterated that functional orientation merely affects
initiation of functioning. Therefore, while it does affect remembering, it
cannot explain it. Remembering occurs as a consequence of the post-functional
activity of uniquely specialized and distributed neuronal elements. It is
this uniqueness quality that determines, in combination, the remembering (or
recreation) of ideas. In other words, changes in orientation may be said to
influence the "episodic" relation between neuronal elements, a relation that
may change from one episode to another. The permanent memorial competence, on
the other hand, would depend on the unique functional properties of individual
neuronal elements.
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The distinction between changes in functional orientation and the post-
functional qualitative properties resposible for the recreation of mental
patterns can clarify the relative contribution of synaptic interaction as
compared to that of individual neurons as physically unitary and functionally
autonomous systems. In other words, synaptic interaction may be responsible
for changes in functional orientation while unique fuctional characteristics
of individual elements could account for remembering itself. If this
hypothesis were correct, it would imply that synaptic interaction must be
episodic in character while not being uniquely tied to the properties of
particular mental structures. Evidence gathered by Kandel and his colleagues
(see Kandel, 1979, 1980) suggests that this may indeed be the case. In what
he called nonassociative learning, Kandel argued that the two antithetical
mechanisms of habituation and sensitization are responsible for what might be
referred to as episodic changes in synaptic interaction. Habituation seems to
decrease the effectiveness of synaptic interaction while sensitization seems
to increase it. Kandel (1979) writes:
Thus, in these simple instances, learning does not involve a dramatic
anatomic rearrangement in the nervous system. No nerve cells or even
synapses are created or destroyed. Rather, learning of habituation and
sensitization changes the functional effectiveness of previously existing
chemical synaptic connections and, in these instances, does so simply by
modulating calcium influx in the presynaptic terminals. Thus, a new
dimension is introduced in thinking about the brain. These complex
pathways, which are genetically determined, appear to be interrupted not
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by disease but by experience, and they can also be restored by
experience.
Finally, the present account of remembering also has implications for the
problem of learning. As Bransford et al. (1977) have noted, the currently
predominant "tacit assumptions [are] that learning necessarily results in
memories, and that these stored memories are responsible for mediating new
interactions with the world" (p. 433). If learning is not the accumulation of
more knowledge or more highly structured knowledge representations, then what
is it? Although we cannot offer a detailed discussion of this issue here, the
functional view indicates that learning must result in (a) neuron
specialization, (b) facility in simultaneous functioning of various components
of the schema-of-the-moment, and (c) facility in independent functioning of
individual components of the schema-of-the-moment. Thus, one outcome of
learning would be the establishment of basic repertoires of specialized
neuronal elements in various independent regions of the nervous
system--visual, motor, and so on. This type of learning is likely to occur
during initial stages and may occur slowly and incrementally. But having a
basic repertoire of specialized elements does not by itself make up the
difference between an expert and a novice. If the functional theory is
correct, this difference must lie in the ability to use the components
(elements or constellations) of the schema-of-the-moment (a) in combination
and (b) independently. An expert can maintain a global pattern and at the
same time use local components of the schema-of-the-moment individually. The
task of the functional theory, therefore, is to specify the functional
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conditions that lead to the establishment of basic repertoires of specialized
neuronal elements. It would also have to specify what functional conditions
lead to facility in simultaneous functioning of various local regions and
independent functioning of element constellations in a particular region.
Awareness and Affect
A crucial aspect of cognition is the phenomenon of awareness. The
functional approach allows an explicit account of it. It was stated earlier
that the neuronal system consists of an unspecified number of uniquely
specialized neuronal elements. One cornerstone of such specialization was the
assumption that a unique feeling of awareness would result from the
functioning of each uniquely specialized neuronal element. In other words, a
particular neuronal element, when in action, can generate a unique "feeling of
knowing," that the given element is in a state of functioning. This is, as it
were, the element's way of announcing, to the global system, that "I'm doing
something." Note that this claim does not presuppose a homunculus to
"perceive" the feeling of knowing and to identify it as such. It simply
indicates that the active neuronal element generates a characteristic feeling
which, in combination with the feelings associated with other functioning
elements, creates the unitary awareness of the moment.
The characteristic feeling of knowing associated with a neuronal element
would be generated only if and when that element functioned singly, i.e.,
independently of any other relevant neuronal element. But presumably this
never happens. Rather, neuronal elements function in unison (e.g., as part of
the schema-of-the-moment). To the extent that they do this, they generate
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nonspecific unitary patterns of awareness, patterns unlike those which would
accompany independent functioning of individual components. As the number of
functioning elements increases, the resulting unitary awareness pattern
becomes more and more nonspecific, i.e., different from the awareness of
individual components. Once again, the light constellation analogy may be
helpful. When a light with a unique color is on alone, it generates precisely
its characteristic pattern of light. When there is a second light with a
different color, a third unitary light pattern is generated, different from
that generated by either of the two individual units alone. However, the
characteristic color of individual light patterns is more evident (or
explicit) in a two-unit light constellation than, say, in a hundred-unit
constellation. Similarly, as the extent of neuronal functioning increases the
pattern becomes more diffuse (nonspecific) and awareness of individual
components becomes more implicit.
One important consequence of this view of awareness is that it provides a
way of conceptualizing tacit knowing (Polanyi, 1958). We may know something
and constantly use it, but unless we localize or individualize it we may never
become explicitly aware of it. This naturally leads us to consider a
complementary function, namely, that involved in individualization (i.e.,
independent usage) of the components of the schema-of-the-moment.
According to Bartlett (1932), localization of schema constituents is an
essential aspect of cognitive functioning and it must happen even to refined
levels of differentiation though not normally to the level of atomic neuronal
elements:
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If any marked further advance is to be achieved, man must learn how to
resolve the 'scheme' into elements, and how to transcend the original
order of occurrence of these elements. This he does, for he learns how
to utilize the constituents of his own 'schemes,' instead of being
determined to action by the 'schemes" themselves, functioning as unbroken
units. He finds out how to "turn round upon his own schemata," as I have
said--a reaction literally rendered possible by consciousness, and the
one which gives to consciousness its pre-eminent function. (Bartlett,
1932, p. 301)
But if individual components seldom function singly, and if a component
must function independently for its characteristic feeling of knowing to be
experienced, how is explicit awareness of individual components possible? How
can a component be part of the schema-of-the-moment and function independently
of it at the same time? One, and perhaps the only possibility is that there
occurs some change in the functioning of a component. Explicit awareness of a
single component is experienced when the latter undergoes a change in relation
to the global schema-of-the-moment; since this is how a component can function
independently of the global functioning system, while maintaining its
continuity with it. This happens when there are increments or decrements in
the level of activation of individual components (neural constellations)
relative to the global level of activation of the schema-of-the-moment. In
this way, a functional view of cognition attempts to explain both explicit
awareness and attention at the same time. The individual becomes explicitly
aware of a schema component when there occurs an independent change in that
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component. As this change occurs, the component becomes the focal center of
the system, assuming it is the only one which is undergoing change. In other
words, the individual attends to the component. Independent functioning,
explicit awareness, and attention become three aspects of the same phenomenon.
This can be the case whether the source of the change is endogenous or
exogenous.
An example of failure of an element to function independently is provided
by the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon. We believe this happens because, while a
person is implicitly aware of a component, that component does not function
independently and, consequently, it cannot be made explicit. A second example
of independent functioning of a schema component was first noted by William
James (1890): the phenomenon occurs when we "hear" the ticking of our clock
only after it stops. Presumably, before the clock stops, there is an
activation-activation irrelevant relationship in the schema-of-the-moment
between neuronal elements involved in the perception of (a ticking) clock and
the rest of the schema-of-the-moment. We cannot hear the clock because the
auditory elements responsible for the perception of the sound are not
functioning independently. However, cessation of stimulation at the time the
clock stops, causes the activation-activation relationship to change suddenly
to an activation-inhibition relationship. Consequently, this independent
functioning makes our awareness of the functioning of the neuronal elements
involved explicit.
The functional view of awareness also suggests an alternative account of
affect and its relation to cognition. While from time to time, many
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influential psychologists have emphasized the prominent role of affect in
organismic functioning (Bartlett, 1932; Berlyne, 1971, 1973; Huey, 1908;
Wundt, 1874, 1907), current structural and information processing theories of
cognition and comprehension have either found it difficult to incorporate or
have simply ignored it (Zajonc, 1980). Empirically, this absence of a sound
theory of affect has led to a great number of unrelated experiments resulting
in often inconclusive and contradictory data (Athey, 1976).
Perhaps the most immediate problem facing a theory of affect is to
provide a plausible account of the nature of arousal and affective valence.
The functional view defines valence in terms of the awareness associated with
the activity of uniquely specialized neuronal elements. We are led,
therefore, to assume that the totality of all neuronal elements may divide
into three broad categories: Those generating a negative valence, those
generating a positive valence, and those generating a neutral valence. This
would imply that the causal loci of the affective valence in the schema-of-
the-moment are the participating neuronal elements. According to this view,
the functioning of a given constellation of neuronal elements has two
independent aspects: A domain-specific valence aspect and a domain-
independent activity aspect (arousal?). While the former depends on the
awareness of the particular constellation, which varies from one constellation
to another, the latter has to do with the very act of functioning itself,
which remains the same from one constellation to another.
This distributed account of affective functioning may be contrasted with
the view that affective variables such as hedonic tone, preference, and
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interestingness are a function of the amount of activity in some unitary
arousal system (Berlyne, 1960, 1973, Hebb, 1955). Optimal-level arousal
theories essentially assume that moderate increments in arousal are
pleasurable and increments beyond some optimal amount are aversive. While
many authors have challenged the notion of an optimal-level function (e.g.,
Arkes & Garske, 1978), there exists no empirical evidence contradicting it.
Arkes and Garske have pointed out that "the problem is simply that an
inverted-U relation allows so many possible curves that the theory is
difficult to disprove" (p. 164). The fact that the inverted-U function has
drawn the attention of so many researchers in spite of the severe problems
associated with it suggests that the problem may also have to do with the
absence of an alternative view to conceptualize the relationship between
arousal and affective variabbles. In a recent demonstration experiment Iran-
Nejad and Ortony (Note 1) explored the utility of a framework which seems to
make it possible to test the inverted-U function. They reasoned that if the
optimal-level hypothesis is correct, then a given level of arousal should
always be either pleasant or unpleasant, but could not be both. They
therefore attempted to show that under different conditions the same level of
arousal can be both pleasant and unpleasant. Following the notion of the
independence of arousal and valence, the study involved separate manipulations
of these variables. The degree of arousal was manipulated by varying the
degree of unexpectedness of story endings and valence was manipulated by
varying story endings so as to invoke positive or negative feelings. It was
found that endings receiving identical (extreme) unexpectedness ratings were
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rated at opposite ends on an (un)pleanantness scale depending on the valence
invoked by the events in the story. Thus, it was shown that a given level of
arousal can be compatible with both positive and negative affect, a finding
that is difficult to accommodate within the framework of optimal-level arousal
theories.
General Summary
This paper has tried to draw an alternative picture of cognition and
comprehension. Starting with only one physically unitary and functionally
autonomous construct, namely, the neuronal element, we have tried to show that
cognition may be more readily conceptualized as a functional phenomenon. Our
account is built around a central psychological construct, the schema-of-the-
moment, that is explained in terms of the functioning of neuronal elements.
Figure 1 illustrates the major causal relations characterizing the two-
way interface between mental experiences and the functioning of the nervous
Insert Figure 1 about here
system. Changes in the activity of distributed neuronal elements serve as the
causal basis for mental experiences of awareness and attention. Mental
experiences, in turn, are assumed to have a causal effect on the activity of
neuronal elements. The central cells in the model are those of independent
and simultaneous functioning. The totality of active neuronal elements tend
to function in concert to the extent that they are consonant. Furthermore,
subgroups of neuronal elements may function independently of the background
Cognition
61
functioning in the schema-of-the-moment. Such simultaneous and independent
functioning are direct causal determinants of the experiences of awareness and
attention.
Even though they arise from the same causal origin, awareness and
attention themselves serve as the causal basis for different mental
judgements. Attention is assumed to be the basis for the subjective judgment
of interestingness, while awareness seems to give rise to the judgment of
valence and to judgments concerning the particular content (or meaning) of the
functioning constellation. In other words, while attention seems to vary only
with the degree of activity in a constellation and remains constant otherwise,
awareness seems to vary from one constellation to another, depending on the
specific properties of the functioning constellation.
The totality of active neuronal elements create a transient functional
organization called the schema-of-the-moment. Simultaneous functioning in
terms of the schema-of-the-moment is thwarted to the extent that there are
active dissonant or irrelevant elements in it, and to the extent that elements
that must enter the chain of combination are still inactive. These factors
provide the causal basis for such subjective judgments as consistency,
inconsistency, suspense, curiosity, expectation, completeness, coherence, and
so on.
Throughout this paper, we have tried to specify the functional properties
of the nervous system that determine the causal paths leading from the
activity of neuronal elements to mental experiences and judgments. However,
the present account is rather vague about the functional properties that
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determine the causal influence of mental states on the functioning of neuronal
elements. We have assumed that the schema-of-the-moment, via the notion of
tuning, affects the functioning of elements. As Figure 1 shows, this is
accomplished by the causal influence on inactive elements of what is already
active. In other words, active components of the schema-of-the-moment must be
utilized as a source of initiation of functioning in inactive elements. This
is possible because if a component of the schema-of-the-moment functions
independently, it generates a characteristic energy pattern that can serve as
a sufficient condition for activating other elements.
Two types of relational vehicles were hypothesized to provide the basis
for the functioning of distributed neuronal elements: A specific, element-
to-element mechanism, and a nonspecific, "all-spreading" relational
environment. The relations among neuronal elements are consonance,
dissonance, or irrelevance. Consonant relations are purely functional,
logical, or pragmatic. Dissonant relations are either resolvable or non-
resolvable.
Unlike traditional views, the present account considers affective
functioning to be no different from cognitive functioning. There is explicit
or implicit awareness of the functioning of (positive, negative, or neutral)
element constellations, depending on whether or not there are independent
changes in the level of activation of these constellations. Affective
functioning often takes place to the extent that pre-existing connections are
unavailable and to the extent that initiation of functioning must depend on
external sources.
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Learning occurs when neuronal elements get specialized, when elements or
element constellations are used in new combinations, and when schema
constituents are individualized, i.e., come to be used independently.
Finally, a word about the empirical consequences of the functional view:
Because the functional view, as outlined in this paper, is intended to provide
a coherent global perspective on cognition, we have made no effort to make
specific empirical predictions. Such predictions require more detailed
hypotheses concerning particular aspects of mental functioning. Nevertheless,
we think that, apart from offering an account of cognition in terms of
relatively concrete constructs, the functional view has one other attractive
feature. It offers the promise of a rapprochment among areas of the cognitive
sciences that traditionally have been not very closely related.
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IThere is a striking parallel between the approach taken by the Roman
physiologist Galen (c.AD 130-201) and current information processing
psychology. Galen was concerned with how inanimate matter, as the input to
the body via foodstuff, is transformed to animate matter. Internal organs
(e.g., the heart, the liver, the lungs) were considered relevant to the extent
that they helped carry out such transformations. In Galen's physiology, as in
information processing psychology, "the most notable feature of the system is
the emphasis on manufacture and transformation. . . processes which convert
. . . substances" (Miller, 1978, p. 187). Information processing psychology
takes the input-transformation-output metaphor for granted. How do we
know--what evidence is there--that there exists some sort of permanent
cognitive substance and that the brain does actually perform transformations
on it? And if there is no permanent object-like entity, what does the
metaphor mean?
2It is perhaps this required dependence of the term function on an actual
functioning system which renders it unpalatable to some structuralists. For
instance, in the opening paragraph of a section entitled Structure and
Function Piaget (1970) states that "there are thinkers who dislike 'the
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subject,' and if this subject is characterized in terms of its 'lived
experience' we admit to being among them" (p. 68). Viewed in the light of the
structuralist's ultimate goal, the dislike for the actual subject becomes
clear. The structuralist hopes to characterize all possible knowledge
structures at some general level, structures which are not likely to exist in
totality in any individual organism. Consequently, structuralism is forced to
call "for a differentiation between the individual subject, who does not enter
at all, and the epistemic subject, that cognitive nucleus which is common to
all subjects at the same level" (Piaget, 1970, p. 139). Structuralists must
create the epistemic subject because they assume that it is the structural
knowledge patterns which constitute the common denominators (the cognitive
nucleus) that the scientist must try to characterize.
3
The notion of structural preformation has been carried to the extreme in
Chomsky's modular approach to human mental capacities. According to Chomsky
(e.g., 1980, 1981), there exist innately programmed "mental organs" for such
human capacities as comprehending a language or doing mathematics in much the
same way as there are bodily organs like the liver, the heart, or even the
arm. Chomsky's major response to those who object to his strict nativism is
that critics have not presented a clearer alternative. We believe the
functional approach does provide a clear alternative: Innate structures may
only exist at the biological and not at the mental level. For instance, the
nervous system may contain highly specialized innate neuronal elements (e.g.,
sensory receptor cells), grossly specialized innate components (e.g., visual,
auditory, motor, etc., cortexes), as well as multi-purpose highly adaptive
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components. More finely articulated specialization can then come with
development and learning. An organism with such innate endowment could also
function "in a rich and complex world of understanding shared with others
similarly endowed, extending far beyond limited and varying experience"
(Chomsky, 1980, p. 4), qualities that lead Chomsky to hypothesize innate
mental organs. According to the functional approach, complex capacities such
as language comprehension do not depend on any unified knowledge organs,
innate or acquired. Rather, mental capacities are distributed across diverse
biological structures, neuroanatomic and otherwise. The fact that human
beings have a highly complex language and other animals do not--if this turns
out to be indeed the case--can be attributed, for instance, to such
differences as the shape of their mouths and vocal organs (which are
incidentally used in eating, coughing, singing, etc.) as well as to the
presence or absence of multi-purpose adaptive components. What one need not
hypothesize is innate knowledge structures. Biological modulation, as opposed
to mental modulation, can account for both universal similarity and diversity
in organismic species.
Recognition has at least two aspects: Re-experiencing a past
experience, and realizing that the experience has occurred in the past--that
it is not a novel experience. We believe both of these aspects should and can
be specified in terms of the functioning of neuronal elements rather than in
terms of cognitive associations.
5
Dissonant conditions may be resolvable or non-resolvable and resolvable
dissonance may lead to precedented or to unprecedented functional
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organizations. Specification of these concepts would require a more detailed
analysis of the functional relations than is necessary or appropriate in the
present context.
6How does the interaction among endogenous, exogenous, and emergent
sources of initiation differ from such traditional concepts as accommodation
and assimilation? As it is commonly defined, accommodation, for example,
refers to gradual developmental changes in knowledge structures. It "displays
itself in exploration, questioning, trial and error, making experiments or by
reflection" (Beard, 1969, p. 19). Even if we extend this concept to include
functional changes, it can only meaningfully describe incremental changes in
the structure of the same schema-of-the-moment. It is not clear how Piagetian
structural theory can explain dramatic shifts of activation which seem to
occur automatically under the influence of exogenous sources. As we mentioned
earlier, there are two aspects to the interaction between endogenous and
exogenous functioning. First, there is the interaction between local and
global aspects of the same schema-of-the-moment. The just-activated
constellation is either consonant, fully or in part, with the global
functioning system or it is dissonant with some local elements only. It does
not disrupt the global functioning pattern. The schema-of-the-moment may
accommodate and the inconsistency is resolved. The second possibility is that
functional dissonance disrupts the global post-functional relations; the
latter temporarily "decomposes" so the elements are free to participate in a
new schema-of-the-moment. This functional condition sets the stage for a
global reorganization. It is this requirement of "decomposition" that
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necessitates the involvement of transient functional relations, as opposed to
the long-term changes implied by the concept of accommodation. In short,
accommodation refers to gradual structural changes. Dramatic functional
reorganizations, on the other hand, can, in principle, lead, often
automatically, to new functional organizations with new global properties
rather than to accommodated versions of an earlier schema.
7We are indebted to Richard Vondruska for bringing this point to our
attention.
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